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Abstract 
 
We embed the Varian (1980) model in a broader setting that 
considers how switcher/loyal customer segments are 
determined.  Generally, customer acquisition is deterministic 
while pricing is randomized.  The equilibrium outcome 
depends on the timing of customer acquisition relative to 
pricing.  If sellers acquire customers before setting prices, the 
unique equilibrium is asymmetric.  If sellers acquire customers 
and set prices simultaneously, the unique equilibrium is 
symmetric.  Our results provide a fundamental justification for 
previous analyses that variously assumed the outcome to be 
asymmetric or symmetric.  The comparative statics for the 
asymmetric and symmetric equilibria are identical. © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  2
1. Introduction 
When two or more sellers of an identical product compete on price for consumers, 
who are variously captives of particular sellers (“captives”) or comparison shoppers 
(“switchers”), the equilibrium outcome is randomized pricing (Butters 1977; Salop 
and Stiglitz 1977; Rosenthal 1980; Varian 1980; Png and Hirshleifer 1987; 
Narasimhan 1988; Raju et al. 1990; Baye et al. 1992).  Randomized pricing has been 
interpreted as sales or price promotions.   
With few exceptions, previous research has left open the question of how 
the captive/switcher segments are determined, and the pricing outcomes when the 
segments are endogenous.  McAfee (1994) and Chioveanu (2003) consider settings 
where sellers first acquire customers and then set prices; they show that the 
equilibria are asymmetric.  Others have focused on more specific scenarios -- two 
sellers (McGahan and Ghemawat 1994; Roy 2000; Chen and Iyer 2002), more than 
two sellers but assuming that the equilibrium is symmetric (Baye and Morgan 2001, 
2004), and a sufficiently large number of small sellers (Butters 1977). 
However, several key issues remain unresolved.  First, the research to date 
has assumed (implicitly) that customer acquisition is deterministic.  Since pricing is 
randomized, it is natural to ask whether customer acquisition would be randomized 
as well.  Second, most research to date has assumed that sellers first acquire 
customers and then set prices (exceptions include Butters (1977) and Robert and 
Stahl (1993)).  But a great deal of advertising and direct marketing includes prices, 
and so, violates the assumption of sequential timing.  What would be the outcome 
if customer acquisition and pricing are simultaneous?  Third, the previous research 
has provided few comparative statics propositions.  To extract useful business and 
policy implications, it is important to derive the comparative statics.  
In this paper, we consider a setting where, initially, all potential consumers 
and all sellers are identical.  Specifically, consumers have identical ex-ante 
information about the sellers and prices, and they have no preferences for 
particular sellers.  Within this setting, we analyze the strategies of a finite number 
of competing sellers on two dimensions – customer acquisition and pricing. © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  3
Each seller must incur a cost to acquire potential consumers, which cost we 
assume to be convex in the number of unique consumers acquired.  Given the 
competing sellers’ expenditures on customer acquisition, consumers endogenously 
divide into captive and switcher segments, depending on whether they are acquired 
by just one or multiple sellers.  
In setting price, each seller must balance two concerns – set a high price to 
extract the maximum surplus from captive consumers or set a low price to 
compete for switchers.  The result of these two conflicting concerns is randomized 
pricing.   
Our contributions are as follows: First, we show that when the marginal cost 
of customer acquisition does not increase too fast, sellers will not randomize 
customer acquisitions (although pricing is randomized). 
Second, we show how the equilibrium outcome depends on the timing of 
customer acquisition relative to pricing.  If sellers acquire customers before setting 
prices, customer acquisition is deterministic and the unique equilibrium is 
asymmetric.  One seller dominates while all other sellers acquiesce – the dominant 
seller acquires twice as many customers as each of the acquiescing sellers and sets 
relatively higher prices.  However, if sellers acquire customers and set prices 
simultaneously, then, customer acquisition is deterministic and the unique 
equilibrium is symmetric.  All sellers acquire the same number of customers and 
set the same pricing strategy. 
Finally, we show how the equilibrium outcome and welfare vary with 
demand, cost, and competitive conditions.  In particular, we show that the 
comparative statics are similar for both asymmetric and symmetric equilibria. 
Our research is of broad significance as the basic scenarios of Butters (1977) 
and Varian (1980), further developed by Narasimhan (1988), have been applied to 
a broad range of strategic issues, including:
1 
•  Mergers and collusion (McAfee 1994; Manduchi 2004);   
                                            
1 At the time of writing, the Social Sciences Citation Index reported the following numbers of 
citations: Butters (1977) – 191; Varian (1980) – 219; and Narasimhan (1988) – 76. © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  4
•  Price information (Robert and Stahl 1993; Baye and Morgan 2001; Chen et 
al. 2002; Iyer and Pazgal 2003; Ghose et al. 2002; Chen and Hitt 2004; 
Moscarini and Ottaviani 2004);  
•  Price matching (Png and Hirshleifer 1987; Corts 1996; Moorthy and Winter 
2002; Chen et al. 2001);  
•  Advertising and branding (Meurer and Stahl 1994; Chioveanu 2003; Baye 
and Morgan 2004; Dukes 2004);  
•  Various other aspects of marketing strategy (McGahan and Ghemawat 
1994; Lal and Villas-Boas 1998; Roy 2000; Chen et al. 2001; Chen and Iyer 
2002; Hong et al. 2002; Morgan and Sefton 2003). 
 
 
2.  Previous Research 
Baye, Morgan, and Sholten (2006) review the literature in detail.  Here, we 
highlight only the most closely relevant work.  Butters (1977) considers a setting 
where competing sellers simultaneously invest in advertising and set prices.  Only 
consumers who receive an advertisement may purchase the item.  When the 
number of sellers is sufficiently large, there is a unique market equilibrium with 
specific advertising and sales price distributions.  Otherwise, when the number of 
sellers is finite, the market equilibrium is unique only if every seller prices 
deterministically.  However, Butters did not characterize the individual seller’s 
equilibrium advertising choices.  It is not clear if the sellers would behave 
symmetrically or asymmetrically. 
Separately, Robert and Stahl (1993) consider competition where sellers set 
advertising and prices simultaneously, but, in a subsequent stage, consumers can 
search among sellers whose advertisements they have not received.  The unique 
equilibrium is symmetric: sellers either set a high price to cater to loyal uninformed 
consumers, or advertise in a range of prices that is strictly lower than the high price 
to attract consumers to search.  However, Robert and Stahl did not address the 
equilibrium outcome in the most parsimonious setting, of just customer acquisition 
and pricing without consumer search. © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  5
Chen and Iyer (2002) study competition between two sellers over two stages.  
In the first stage, the sellers invest in information to address potential consumers.  
All consumers are addressed: those addressed by only one seller are captive of that 
seller, while those addressed by both sellers are switchers.   In the second stage, the 
sellers set prices. If cost of information is high or consumers differ greatly, the 
equilibrium is symmetric in information and pricing, while if the cost is low or 
consumers are similar in tastes, then the equilibrium is asymmetric.  Chen and Iyer 
did not address the outcome with more than two sellers.
2 
  Chioveanu (2003) considers competition between multiple sellers over two 
stages.   In the first stage, sellers invest in advertising to persuade customers.  All 
consumers who are not reached become switchers and buy from the lowest-price 
seller.
3  In the second stage, sellers set prices.  There exist multiple asymmetric 
pricing equilibria, in which one seller randomizes over a continuous distribution 
and all other sellers price at the consumers’ reservation value with some probability 
mass.  These are supported by asymmetric investments in advertising.   
Baye and Morgan (2004) study a setting similar to that of Chioveanu’s (2003) 
except that, in the second stage, sellers decide whether to list at a price-comparison 
website as well as set prices.  Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium, Baye and 
Morgan show that all sellers invest in advertising, and then randomize between 
pricing randomly with a listing on the website, and pricing at the consumers’ 
reservation value with no listings. 
In an important contribution, McAfee (1994) studies competition between 
multiple sellers over two stages.  In the first stage, sellers invest in “availability” to 
secure customers (this is similar to “advertising” in Butters (1977) and others, or 
“addressability” in Chen and Iyer (2002)).  Consumers can buy the item only if it is 
available at the store that they patronize, and then, they buy from the lowest-price 
seller.  In the second stage, sellers set prices.  McAfee proves that the unique 
                                            
2  In a similar setting, Roy (2000) focuses on sellers’ decisions of whether to address separate or 
overlapping segments. 
3  Chioveanu’s (2003) analysis is, however, silent on the behavior of customers who are reached 
by more than one seller. © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  6
equilibrium is asymmetric: a large seller invests in twice the availability of every other 
seller, and then, the large seller sets relatively higher prices than the other sellers.  
Prior research failed to address an obvious, rather fundamental question.    
In these settings, pricing is randomized, but what about customer acquisitions – are 
they deterministic or randomized?  Further, most prior research assumed that 
sellers acquire customers before setting prices.  What if, as assumed by Butters 
(1977) and often happens in practice, sellers acquire customers and set prices at the 
same time?
4  Would there be a unique equilibrium, or, as conjectured by Butters 
(1977, p. 471), are the sellers’ strategies indeterminate?  Finally, how do the 
comparative statics depend on the timing of actions and nature of the equilibrium?  
These are the questions that we address. 
 
3.  Setting 
Each potential consumer derives benefit v from one unit of some item, which may 
be a good or service.  A potential consumer can purchase the item only if acquired 
by a seller (Butters 1977; Grossman and Shapiro 1984; McAfee 1994; Stegeman 
1991; Roy 2000; Chen and Iyer 2002; Soberman 2005).   
The marketing can be interpreted as either advertising in the mass media or 
direct marketing through mail, telephone, or email.  Yet another interpretation is 
seller’s investments to reduce costs that consumers incur to switch products 
(Klemperer 1987).
















1 ln 1 ln ) ( ,         (1) 
where  0 > c  is a constant and L is the total number of potential consumers.
6  For 
simplicity, we assume that A and L are continuous variables rather than integers.  
                                            
4  Robert and Stahl (1993) address this issue, but in a context where consumers can spend on 
search, and so derive results which McAfee (1994) describes as being “qualitatively different”.  
5  Models (e.g., Chioveanu 2003; Baye and Morgan 2004) in which sellers need not invest to sell 
to switchers cannot capture such switching costs. 
6  Specification (1) follows Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and McAfee (1994).  In the Appendix, 
we provide a motivation for this specification and explain why it is more reasonable than the 
quadratic cost function assumed by Chen et al. (2001a) and Chen and Iyer (2002). © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  7
Alternatively, we could interpret  L A/  as the fraction of consumers acquired, which 
then would clearly be a continuous variable.  
  We consider two alternative specifications for the timing of sellers’ actions: 
•  Sellers acquire customers before setting prices, and 
•  Sellers acquire customers and set prices simultaneously. 
A potential consumer who is acquired by a seller will pay up to v for the 
item.  A consumer who is acquired by more than one seller will be a switcher and 
purchase from the seller offering the lowest price, or buy with equal probability 
from each of several sellers that offer the same price.  
  We make the following regularity assumptions to ensure that the sellers will 
earn positive profit from customer acquisition: 
c v > ,             ( 2 )  
and 
  1








X .             ( 3 )  
The parameter X represents the cost of acquiring a new customer relative to the 
potential demand.  For sufficiently large L,  1 / < ≅ v c X , hence (2) implies (3). 
Let  ) (A Gi , with support  i T , where  ) inf( i i T A =  and  ) sup( ˆ
i i T A = , represent 
seller i’s acquisition strategy, for  n i ,..., 1 = .  Without loss of generality, let the sellers 
be labeled in decreasing order of the suprema of their supports, i.e., such that 
n A A A ˆ ... ˆ ˆ
2 1 ≥ ≥ ≥ . Let the seller with the largest realized number of customers 
acquired be labeled m, i.e.,  i m A A ≥ , all  n i ,..., 1 = . 
Let  ) (p Fi , with support  i S , where  ) inf( i i S p =  and  ) sup( ˆ i i S p = , represent   
seller i’s pricing strategy.  Further, let p  be the lowest among the infima of the 
supports of the various pricing strategies, i.e.,  ) min(
i p p = .   
Consider seller i.  Its expected revenue at any price p depends on whether 
the customers are also acquired by another seller and, if so, the other seller’s price(s) © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  8
relative to seller i’s.  Seller i would sell with certainty to consumers not acquired by 
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consumers are acquired by all n sellers.  Seller i will secure these consumers only if 
its price,  p , is lower than that of all other sellers, which occurs with probability 
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Accordingly, seller i’s expected revenue at any price  p,
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 (4) 
To explain (4), seller i would sell to every customer that it acquires, provided that 
either the customer is not acquired by any other seller, or, the other sellers who 
acquire her set higher prices.  
Following McAfee (1994), the next result generalizes the findings of 
Narasimhan (1988), Baye et al. (1992), and Chioveanu (2003) to a setting where the 
captive and switcher segments differ among sellers.  It is key to characterizing the 
pricing outcome.  
Lemma 1.   Suppose that either customer acquisitions take place before price 
setting, or customer acquisitions are deterministic.  Then, in the pricing equilibrium, 
(a) There is no pure-strategy equilibrium; 
(b) The supports of the pricing strategies of at least two sellers have supremum 
at v, i.e.,  v pi = ˆ , at least two i; 
                                            
7  In Varian (1980), Png and Hirshleifer (1987), and Baye et al. (1992), consumers are acquired by 
either one seller or all sellers.  Then, the analysis of the 2-seller case can be extended to the  3 ≥ n  
sellers by simply redefining the distribution of the competing seller’s price as the distribution of 
the lowest of the  1 − n  competitors’ prices.  Our setting is more complicated: consumers may be 
acquired by more than one but fewer than n sellers.   © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  9
(c) The supports of the pricing strategies of at least two sellers have infimum at 
p , i.e.,  p p
i = , at least two i;  
(d) Equilibrium pricing strategies do not include any mass points in the interval, 
) , [ v p ; no more than one seller may have a mass point, which must be at v; 
(e) The supports of the pricing strategies of all sellers have the same infimum, 
p , i.e.,  p p










v p 1 ;          ( 5 )  
(f) The supports of equilibrium pricing strategies are intervals (and so, do not 
have any gaps); 
(g) For sellers 1 and 2,  v p p = = 2 1 ˆ ˆ , while among all other sellers, a seller which 
acquires more consumers will have a support with a higher supremum, i.e., 
if  j i A A > , then  j i p p ˆ ˆ > . 
(h) For every seller i, expected revenue is 











i i i L
A
vA A p R 1 .         ( 6 )  
For brevity, we report the proofs of all results in the online Appendix.
8 
 
4.  Sequential Action 
We now analyze the equilibrium outcome when sellers acquire customers before 
setting prices.  In the second stage, when setting prices, every seller knows how 
many customers the other sellers have acquired.   
A preliminary issue is whether sellers will randomize customer acquisitions.  
Proposition 1 shows that, if the marginal cost of customer acquisition does not 
increase too fast, the seller will not randomize.  This is algebraically equivalent to 
the condition that the number of potential consumers be sufficiently large.   
                                            
8 http://www.comp.nus.edu.sg/~ipng/research/sales_appx.pdf © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  10
Proposition 1.  If sellers acquire customers before setting prices, for sufficiently 
large L, customer acquisition is deterministic. 
  The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows.  Generally, a seller’s marginal 
profit arising from an increase in acquisitions equals its marginal revenue less 
marginal cost.   
  The seller’s increase in acquisitions affects revenue in two ways.  First, it 
directly raises revenue in proportion to the increase in acquisitions (positive 
marginal revenue).  Second, by Lemma 1, with the probability that the seller’s 
acquisition is not the largest among all sellers, the increase would reduce the price 
and hence reduce revenue (negative marginal revenue).  The negative effect is in 
proportion to the square of the increase in acquisitions because the price effect is 
multiplied by the acquisitions.   
Accordingly, for levels of acquisitions below the highest possible, a seller’s 
revenue is concave in acquisitions.  By (1), the cost of acquisitions is convex.   
Hence, the seller’s profit is concave in acquisitions, and hence no sellers would 
randomize so long as some “big” seller chooses a high level of acquisition and 
deterministically.  A similar argument shows that the “big” seller would also not 
randomize acquisitions.  This implies that, if sellers randomize acquisitions, at least 
two sellers, say 1 and 2, must have the same supremum, say A ˆ , in the supports of 
their acquisition strategies. 
Now, consider seller 1’s expected profit from raising acquisitions to slightly 
above  A ˆ .  As explained above, this will directly raise revenue.  However, since  A ˆ  is 
the highest level of acquisition among the other sellers, the increase would not 
reduce price.  Accordingly, the marginal revenue for  A A ˆ
1 >   is greater than the 
marginal revenue for  A A ˆ
1 < .  If the marginal cost does not increase too fast, the 
variation would raise profit, which means that any set of strategies with more than 
one seller randomizing at  A ˆ  would not constitute an equilibrium. 
Given that sellers do not randomize customer acquisition, we can now state 
Proposition 2, which characterizes the equilibrium outcome.  In part, this result 
applies McAfee’s (1994) Theorem 3. © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  11
Proposition 2.  If sellers acquire customers before setting prices, the unique 
equilibrium comprises, in the first stage, sellers  n i ,..., 2 =  acquiring 
























1 ,          ( 7 )  
and seller 1 acquiring 
*
1 2A A =  customers, and, in the second stage, sellers  n i ,..., 2 =  

































p F ,         ( 8 )  














− = ,           ( 9 )  
and seller 1 setting prices according to the distribution  ) ( 2 1 ) ( 1 p F p F =  on  the 
support  ) , [ v p , with a mass point of weight ½ at the price v.   
The intuition of Proposition 2 is as follows.  Generally, a seller considering 
whether to increase acquisitions must balance three consequential effects on 
expected profit: the increase as such would raise sales (raising profit), the increase 
would through (5) reduce price (reducing profit), and the increase would raise cost 
(reducing profit).  However, if one seller were to increase acquisition beyond every 
other seller’s acquisition, then, by (5), any further increase would not affect the 
price, and hence, it would have a greater incentive to increase acquisitions.  Since 
the other sellers are ex-ante identical, they choose the same level of acquisitions.   
Accordingly, the equilibrium is asymmetric, with one seller acquiring twice as many 
customers as the others. 
  By (7), sellers’ expenditures on customer acquisition are strategic substitutes. 
To interpret condition (7), substitute for  X  from (3), 
 






























The left-hand side is the probability that a consumer has not been acquired by any 
seller, multiplied by the consumer’s reservation value and the number of potential © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  12
consumers.  Hence, it is related to the expected marginal revenue.  The right-hand 
side is related to the marginal cost of customer acquisition. 
  It is difficult to characterize the asymmetric equilibrium explicitly because (7) 
is a polynomial of degree n.  However, we can derive bounds on 










































we infer that 
  [] [] L X A L X
n n − < < − 1 1
2
1 * .         ( 1 0 )  
 
5.  Simultaneous Action 
In this case, we suppose that sellers acquire customers and set prices at the same 
time.  Then, obviously, sellers cannot condition prices on customer acquisition.  As 
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s e q u e n t i a l  a c t i o n ,  w e  f i rst prove that sellers will not randomize 
customer acquisitions. 
Proposition 3.  If sellers acquire customers and set prices simultaneously, 
customer acquisition is deterministic. 
  Intuitively, when acquisition and pricing occur simultaneously, each seller’s 
profit is concave in its own acquisitions.  Hence, randomizing over any two levels 
of acquisitions would be less profitable than choosing some intermediate level of 
acquisition with certainty. 
  The next proposition shows that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric.    
Proposition 4.  If sellers acquire customers and set prices simultaneously, the 
unique equilibrium comprises acquisition  
[ ]L X A
n
s − = 1  ,           ( 1 1 )  



































.            ( 1 3 )  
For the case of simultaneous action, Butters (1977) derived the market 
advertising and sales price distributions, but did not characterize the behavior of 
individual sellers.  Robert and Stahl (1993) proved that the equilibrium is unique 
and symmetric, but in a context including consumer search.  Much previous 
research, for instance, Varian (1980) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984), simply 
assumed that the equilibrium was symmetric.  By contrast, Proposition 4 shows 
that the equilibrium is unique and symmetric when sellers acquire customers and set 
prices simultaneously.  Accordingly, it provides a fundamental justification for a 
focus on symmetric outcomes. 
 
 
6.  Duopoly 
The two-seller case of Varian’s (1980) and related models has been widely applied 
to issues of business and marketing strategy (e.g., McGahan and Ghemawat 1994; 
Chen and Iyer 2002; Chen et al. 2001a and 2001b; Ghose et al. 2002).  An 
important question then is whether and how such models scale up to the case of 
more than two sellers.  We focus on the case of sequential action.
 9 
By Proposition 2, with  2 = n , solving (7) and substituting in (8), the unique 
equilibrium comprises in the first stage, seller 2 acquiring 
* A  customers where 
L X A ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣




3 * , 
and seller 1 acquiring 
*
1 2A A =  customers, and, in the second stage, seller 2 setting 
prices according to the atomless distribution,  
                                            
9  It is easy to see the results with simultaneous action from Proposition 4 – each seller would 













and seller 1 setting prices according to the distribution  ) ( 2 1 ) ( 1 p F p F = , with a 
mass point of weight ½ at the price v.   
  Whether there are two or more sellers, the unique equilibrium is asymmetric, 
and a dominant seller acquires twice as many customers as the other acquiescing 
sellers.  Hence, the model scales up in a particular way – as the number of sellers 
increases, the dominant seller becomes smaller relative to the market.  Further, in 
the next section, we show that, as the model scales up, the dominant seller actually 
becomes smaller on an absolute basis as well.  More importantly, for managerial 
implications, we show that the impact of changes in cost and demand parameters 
on the profit-maximizing acquisition and pricing strategies remains qualitatively the 




7.  Comparative Statics 
Given the number of sellers, n, and the demand and cost parameters, v, L and c 
(which together determine X ), we can solve (7) numerically for 
* A .  Figure 1 
shows the equilibrium acquisitions as a function of  X  at various levels of n. 
 
Figure 1.  Equilibrium Acquisitions, n = 2, 5, 10 © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  15
Generally, Table 1 below reports comparative statics with respect to changes 
in the cost of customer acquisition, the consumers’ reservation value, the number of 
potential consumers, and the number of sellers.  More importantly, for managerial 
strategy and public policy implications, the comparative statics for the sequential and 
simultaneous cases (which correspond to the asymmetric and symmetric outcomes 
respectively) are identical. 
Table 1.  Comparative Statics 
  * A   F   1 F
#  p  s A   s F  
Increase in c –    –  –  +  –  – 
Increase in v +  +  +  –  +  + 
Increase in L
## +  –  –  +  +  – 
Increase in n –  ?
### ?
 ### –  – ?
 ## 
∞ → n   0  Mass point 
at  Xv  
Mass point 
at  Xv 
Xv  0  Mass point 
at  Xv  
#  In addition, the dominant seller’s pricing strategy includes a mass point at v.  
##  The results apply when L is sufficiently large.    
### The price distribution becomes more extreme -- sellers tend towards either low or high prices 
and the impact on the average price is ambiguous. 
Referring to Figure 1, the equilibrium number of customers acquired, 
* A , is a 
convex function of the cost of acquisitions relative to the market parameter, X .    
With more sellers, the function becomes relatively more convex, so 
* A  is  more 
sensitive to changes in X  at low levels of X , and less sensitive at higher levels.  
Accordingly, 
* A  is more sensitive to changes in c, v, and L at low levels of X  (i.e., 
when the market is lucrative), and less sensitive at higher levels of X  (i.e., when the 
market is not so attractive to sellers).   
In the limit of both asymmetric and symmetric equilibria, as  ∞ → n , the price 
essentially converges to Xv, which is sufficient for the seller’s revenue to slightly 
exceed its cost of customer acquisition.  Hence, as the number of sellers increases 
without limit, the equilibrium converges to perfect competition.    
It is useful to contrast our pricing results with previous models of price 
competition where consumer segments were exogenous.  In the latter, when a new 
seller enters, it would raise competition for segment of switchers, without affecting © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  16
any seller’s captive segment.  So, for each seller, the balance in pricing would shift 
toward charging a higher price to extract profit from captive consumers (Rosenthal 
1980; Png and Hirshleifer 1987; Iyer and Pazgal 2002).  Hence, in equilibrium, prices 
would be higher. 
In our more realistic setting, there is a countervailing effect – when a new 
seller enters, it acquires both consumers who had been acquired by only one seller 
(captive to that seller), as well as consumers who had been acquired by more than 
one seller (switchers).  The net effect on pricing is ambiguous as sellers are torn 
between reducing price to compete for the switchers and raising price to capture 
more revenue from the captive consumers. 
 
 
8.  Welfare 
Generally, in our context, social welfare is the benefit to consumers less the sellers’ 
cost of customer acquisitions.  In turn, the benefit to consumers is v times the net 
number of consumers served (net of overlaps among the sellers’ acquisitions). 
In the case of sequential action, the consumer benefit is 


































,        ( 1 4 )  
after substituting from (7).  Further, the sellers’ cost of customer acquisitions, 
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) / 1 1 ln(
) / 1 ln(
] 1 [
) / 1 1 ln(















































−      (15) 
after substituting from (7).   
Hence, social welfare is 







− − = .          ( 1 6 )  
It is straightforward to show that in the case of simultaneous action, social welfare 
is also given by (16).  Hence, the number of consumers served and social welfare 
are the same whether sellers act sequentially or simultaneously. © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  17
Further, the welfare in (16) is independent of the number of sellers.  This 
result follows from the nature of the cost function, (1).  As discussed in the 
Appendix, the cost function (1) exhibits what McAfee (1994) terms “constant 
returns to scale” in the sense that a seller’s total cost and net expected yield (after 
removing duplicates) are the same whether customers are acquired in a single batch 
or several smaller batches. 
We consider this cost function as a useful benchmark case.  If the cost of 
customer acquisition were to exhibit decreasing returns to scale, then an increase in 
the number of sellers would raise welfare, and similarly, if there are increasing 
returns, then increasing the number of sellers would reduce welfare. 
 
9.  Concluding Remarks 
We have embedded the Varian (1980) model in a broader setting that considers 
how customer segments are determined.  Our first result is that if the marginal cost 
of customer acquisitions does not increase too fast, then customer acquisitions are 
deterministic.  
Second, we have shown that the unique equilibrium is asymmetric if customer 
acquisition takes place before price setting, but the unique equilibrium is symmetric if 
customer acquisition and price setting are simultaneous.  Our findings provide a 
fundamental rationale for previous analyses that exogenously assumed that the 
equilibrium outcome would be asymmetric (Narasimhan 1988; McGahan and 
Ghemawat 1994) or symmetric (e.g., Varian 1980; Grossman and Shapiro 1984; 
Png and Hirshleifer 1987; Meurer and Stahl 1994; Baye and Morgan 2001 and 2004; 
Iyer and Pazgal 2003).
10 
  Besides the contribution to the pure analytics of price competition among 
multiple sellers of an identical product for consumers who vary in loyalty to 
particular sellers, our results also contribute to understanding the dynamics of 
                                            
10  The focus on symmetric equilibria can also be justified empirically by the many experiments 
showing that subjects tend to select symmetric rather than asymmetric outcomes (Van Huyck et 
al. 1990; Battalio et al. 2003). © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  18
customer acquisition, be it interpreted as mass media advertising, availability, direct 
marketing, consumer addressability, or investments to reduce consumer switching 
costs. 
Following McAfee (1994), our analysis can easily be extended to allow 
consumers to have elastic demand.  Let k  be the marginal cost of producing the 
item and  ) (p q  be the individual consumer’s demand at price p.  Then, in the key 
equations like (5) and (6), each seller equilibrates between the contribution margin, 
) ( ] [ p q k p m − = , at the various prices, rather than equilibrating between the prices 
themselves.  With this change, all the major results continue to apply. 
The immediate direction for future research is to analyze the equilibrium 
outcome when potential consumers have different individual demand curves.  This 
would reduce the price elasticity of demand around a competitor’s price and dilute 
the incentive for a seller to just under-cut its competitor’s prices.  We conjecture 
this change would reinforce the tendency towards asymmetric equilibria. 
Another direction for future research is to take account of consumer search 
(Butters 1977; Stahl 1989; Robert and Stahl 1993; Banks and Moorthy 1999; 
Anderson and de Palma 2003; Baye and Morgan 2004).  The equilibrium outcome 
would then depend on both sellers’ investments in customer acquisition and 
consumers’ investments in search.  Robert and Stahl (1993) show that if consumers 
search after sellers set advertising and prices simultaneously, the unique equilibrium 
is symmetric.  The outcome when sellers acquire customers before setting prices, 
and then consumers search, appears to be an open question.  
 © 2005, Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png  19
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